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Abstract: The Rowlands target article makes a case, based on John Locke’s metaphysical
argument, that personhood can be applied to many species beyond a few nonhuman primates.
The problem with this argument is that personhood has an open-ended list of defining attributes
and can, at best only be partially applied to nonhuman species. Therefore, a dichotomous
distinction cannot be made between qualifying and non-qualifying species. Instead, betweenspecies comparisons must be based on observational and experimental procedures to
demonstrate the extent to which human mental attributes are shared with other species. This
would allow a more informed view about the appropriateness of personhood in nonhumans.
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Using John Locke’s metaphysical approach to defining human personhood, Rowlands (2016)
argues for extending personhood to nonhumans. The metaphysical approach to defining
personhood is based on defining “what something is,” namely, what features it has that confer
on it the status of a “person.” Since metaphysical concepts cannot be seen directly, this
definition comes close to being circular.
Rowlands’s specific claim is that a necessary condition for personhood is a capability for
pre-reflective awareness, an ability to perceive some event without necessarily having an
understanding of the fact that one is aware of that perception. In other words, pre-reflective
awareness does not imply the presence of an intentional state. The final conclusion is that there
is a “unity” of awareness and mental life that constitutes the basis for personhood.
A fundamental problem with Rowlands’s argument is illustrated by his example of a
chimpanzee who avoids a desirable food when a more dominant chimpanzee is nearby. Was this
a case of higher order intentionality where the submissive chimpanzee knows what the
dominant chimpanzee is thinking or is it simply “behavior-reading?” Rowlands suggests that
even if it is merely behavior-reading, the chimpanzee meets Locke’s test because it passes the
test for pre-reflective awareness. In a well-controlled test Hare, Call, & Tomasello (2001)
showed that a submissive chimpanzee’s willingness to take food in the presence of a dominant
chimpanzee depended upon whether or not the dominant chimpanzee’s view of the food was
obscured behind a barrier. The submissive chimpanzee’s behaviors were consistent with

1

Animal Sentience 2016.139: King on Rowlands on Animal Personhood

reflective awareness and a higher order intentionality and therefore exceeded Locke’s criterion
for personhood. The low bar of mere pre-reflective awareness would allow attribution of
personhood to an absurdly large number of species, primate and non-primate, who would fail
Hare’s test but still pass a less restrictive test for pre-reflective awareness.
As shown by the target article, a metaphysical approach can be applied to humancentered mental traits. This is possible because terms such as “self,” “implicit,” reflective,” and
“nonreflective awareness,” “mental life,” and “mental unity” have commonly accepted,
dictionary-based definitions that can be further refined by metaphysical arguments based on
human mentality. However, a critical point is that when mentalistic terms are applied across
species, they are only meaningful when based on empirical, data-based evidence. Furthermore,
whether these terms, including personhood, are applicable to nonhuman species cannot be
answered by a simple yes or no.
“Nature abhors a dichotomy.” Evolution in particular abhors a dichotomy for any trait,
including species differences in cognitively or mentally related traits. The problem is that
descriptions of human traits are open-ended; they are not defined by one specific set of criteria,
but by consistency with a list of many criteria that can be augmented at any time and will also
vary across species. Attributing the trait of mentality thus becomes a moving target: criteria
change often, depending on the viewpoint of the researcher and the context of the data
collection. When a mentalistic term is applied to a nonhuman species, some of the human
criteria for the term typically generalize to the nonhuman whereas others do not. This is
illustrated by examples of three human characteristics that have been partially expressed in
great apes: language, morality, and personality. These characteristics do not specifically involve
personhood but are relevant to the general argument for animal personhood.
After the first evidence that a chimpanzee could learn to understand and produce sign
language (Gardner & Gardner, 1969) a cascade of criticism emerged (and continues to this day)
claiming that the chimpanzee’s performance was not related to language but a simpler
phenomenon (e.g., Hauser, Chomsky, & Fitch 2002). A large body of well-controlled research
(Gillespie-Lynch, Greenfield, Lynn, & Savage-Rumbaugh, 2014) nevertheless confirmed that
bonobos are capable of mastering many attributes of human language, including generativity or
productivity (ability to understand novel sentences). In addition, bonobos are capable of
engaging in informal conversations with humans, responding to spoken English with words by
means of a hand-held keyboard.
Recent research has demonstrated that chimpanzees have a rudimentary sense of
morality in their interactions with conspecifics. Examples include the preference of food-sharing
chimpanzees for a token providing food for itself and a conspecific over a token providing food
only for itself (Horner, Carter, Suchak, & de Waal, 2011), as well as more general sharing
(Warneka & Tomasello, 2015) and empathy (de Waal, 2008) among conspecifics.
The third domain showing a continuity between humans and animals is the structure of
personality differences. King & Figueredo (1994) demonstrated a similarity between the human
Big Five personality dimensions (Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Neuroticism,
and Openness) and personality dimensions of chimpanzees based on personality-descriptive
adjectives. Orangutans (Weiss, King, & Perkins, 2006) likewise display a personality structure
resembling that of humans. The relationship of personality dimensions to rated subjective well-
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being in both species is similar to that in humans. There are clear differences across species, but
the overall similarities underlying the cross-species differences are striking.
Alfred Russell Wallace (1910) published a book containing a chapter entitled “Is nature
cruel?” His remarkable answer was “No.” He justified his answer by claiming that evolutionary
forces would have inured animals to suffering because responses to the suffering would have
reduced fitness in the uncertain and dangerous natural habitat. An additional claim was that any
susceptibility to suffering was directly related to intelligence. Therefore, only humans with their
intelligence vastly exceeding that of any animal could be susceptible to agonies and suffering.
Unfortunately, Wallace’s view is still consistent with the attitudes of many people towards
animals. This view of a dichotomy between humans and nonhumans can be countered by
showing that animals are sentient, self-aware beings with capacities for suffering, emotions, and
empathy not unlike our own. The three examples noted above are consistent with a narrowing
of the human-animal distinction and not only refute Wallace’s assertion but are also relevant to
the issue of personhood beyond the human.
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